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Abstract 
 
State aid for rescue and restructuring (R&R) of companies in difficulty causes a 
significant distortion of competition. It prevents the market from eliminating 
inefficient companies. Because of this, the European Commission has to be 
specially strict when it assesses rescue or restructuring aid. This paper examines 
recent cases of corporate restructuring partly funded with public money. It 
explains the main aspects of the current guidelines which are applicable to R&R 
State Aid and establishes a theoretical framework for the economic assessment of 
R&R aid. It then analyses decisions adopted by the European Commission 
concerning R&R state aid during the period 2000-2013. It finds that there is little 
economic rationale in the granting of R&R aid. The paper concludes by applying 
the lessons drawn from the empirical analysis to the anticipated revision of the 
R&R guidelines in the context of the State Aid Modernisation process.  
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1. Introduction 
State aid is in principle prohibited in the European Union because it distorts 
competition in the internal market. However, this prohibition is not absolute. EU 
rules on state aid correctly acknowledge that in certain situations public subsidies 
may be necessary to remedy market failure. Therefore, state aid for such policy 
objectives as environmental protection or encouragement of research and 
training is allowed under certain conditions. In this context, the purpose of state 
aid is to fill a gap left by the market. 
 
However, in the case of state aid for the rescue or restructuring of firms there is 
no obvious market failure. In fact, one may reasonably argue that the market is 
working too well. It eliminates inefficient firms. After all, this is the ultimate 
consequence of competition. Those who cannot compete must either exit the 
market or simply go bankrupt. Therefore, rescue and restructuring aid is one of 
the most distortionary types of aid because it counteracts the normal functioning 
of the market mechanism. 
 
So why do governments intervene to rescue firms or bear some of the costs of 
their restructuring? Their ostensible aim is to avoid the consequences of firm 
failure, which are unemployment and loss of output. Occasionally it is also 
claimed that the failure of an especially large company would allow the creation 
of monopoly or oligopoly with detrimental effects on consumers. Although these 
claims may be aired frequently, it is rather doubtful that monopoly or oligopoly is 
the outcome of the failure of a single company. In fact, such a claim has not been 
documented in Europe, nor is there credible evidence that the rescue or 
restructuring of a company has prevented the emergence of monopoly or 
oligopoly. Therefore, the avoidance of local unemployment and loss of output 
appear to be more tenable policy objectives. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the efficiency of restructuring aid (we 
ignore rescue aid because it is granted only for six months until a restructuring 
plan is put in place). A number of studies have already assessed the 
effectiveness of rescue and restructuring aid by investigating whether the aid has 
been successful in ensuring the long-term viability of the aid recipient companies. 
Their findings are mixed. A significant proportion of the aid beneficiaries have not 
managed to escape bankruptcy. The reasons for the failure of aid to prevent 
bankruptcy are not known. Perhaps the aid was granted too late. Or perhaps the 
aid recipients were already in such dire condition that no aid could have helped 
them. 
 
An issue that has not been sufficiently investigated in the literature is whether 
governments are justified in intervening in the first place. Intervention is in 
principle justified when the benefits from protecting jobs exceed the costs of job 
losses. Using data we have gathered from Commission decisions concerning 
restructuring measures during the past decade, we calculate both the costs of 
intervention and the expected benefits in terms of the value of the jobs which are 
saved. 
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We find that a significant proportion of these measures are inefficient in the 
sense that they cost more than the output they save. These findings cast doubt 
on the economic rationality of restructuring aid and suggest that governments are 
guided by political objectives. 
 
At the same time, these findings provide support for a more active role by the 
Commission and a more rigorous assessment of restructuring aid. In this 
connection, we make a number of proposals for the forthcoming reform of the 
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. The Commission has already launched a 
public consultation on the reform of those Guidelines. This reform takes place in 
the broader revision of all the state aid rules for the period 2014-20. One of the 
main aims of the revision, which was formally initiated with the Commission 
communication on the State Aid Modernisation in May 2012, is to inject more 
economic analysis of the necessity of aid. Our proposals are very much in line 
with this increased emphasis on proper economic evaluation of state aid. 
 
 
2. Objectives and conditions of the state aid rules on rescue & 
restructuring 
 
Why should firms in difficulty be assisted and how? Current rules on state aid for 
rescue & restructuring (RR) provide answers to these two questions. We will 
explain in the following sections that these answers are not satisfactory. 
 
The Guidelines on Aid for Rescue & Restructuring (RRG) are based on the 
premise that such aid “may only be regarded as legitimate subject to certain 
conditions (…) for instance”:1 
1) for social or regional policy considerations (such as local unemployment); 
2) because of the beneficial role played by SMEs in the economy;  
3) or to maintain a competitive market structure (for example if the bankruptcy of 
the firm generates a monopoly or an oligopoly in the market). 
 
Aid has to comply with five cumulative conditions. 
1) it may be granted only to a firm in difficulty;2  
2) the restructuring plan must ensure the restoration of the long-term viability of 
the ailing firm in a reasonable period of time;3 
3) it has to avoid undue distortions of competition.4 The ailing company has to 
offer “compensatory measures” such as reduction of capacity, withdrawal from 
certain market segments or sale of assets;  
                                                          
1 European Commission (2004), paragraph 8 
2 European Commission (2004), paragraph 33. Although it does not exist a European Union definition of 
what we understand by  “firm in difficulty”, the Guidelines establish a number of conditions that in case of 
been fulfilled, a firm will be considered “firm in difficulty” to the effects of the Guidelines and thus eligible 
for R&R State Aid.  
3 European Commission (2004), paragraphs 34-37 
4 European Commission (2004), paragraphs 38-42 
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4) the aid has to be the minimum necessary.5 The beneficiary has to bear a 
substantial part of the restructuring costs (“own contribution”). The percentage of 
own contribution depends on the size of the company: 50% for large firms, 40% 
for medium-sized firms, and 25% for small firms.6  
5) Aid is granted once (“one-time-last-time” rule). In practice this means only 
once per 10 years.7 
  
 
3. The economics of rescue & restructuring aid 
 
R&R aid is perceived as one the “most distortive type of aid” by the European 
Commission. It interrupts the normal functioning of the market system, whereby 
firms less efficient than their competitors are driven out of the market.8 This 
assures an efficient allocation of resources. 
 
It is also the most important source of increase in competitiveness, as explained 
by Lyons et al (2008). Public intervention generates both direct and indirect 
negative effects:  
 
The direct effect is the prevention of bankruptcy. This means that the State 
manipulates market shares and employment levels. If one firm does not 
disappear, it does so at the expense of its competitors, which may be more 
efficient. 
 
There are also indirect negative effects, which are generated by the mere 
existence of an R&R aid. Less efficient firms know that the government would 
rescue them. This creates moral hazard and willingness to undertake riskier 
investments. Correspondingly more efficient firms are discouraged from investing 
when they know that the government will rescue their competitors. 
 
In view of these concerns, should state aid for R&R be allowed and, if so, under 
which conditions? We ignore in our analysis below moral hazard issues and other 
opportunistic kind of behaviour on the part of potential aid beneficiaries. This is 
because it is not necessary to make our analysis more realistic in order, first, to 
explain its logic and, second, to identify the risks in the granting of state aid for 
R&R purposes. 
 
As with all kinds of aid, government intervention is in principle warranted when it 
addresses a market failure. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition. In 
addition, the social benefits from intervention should outweigh its costs.  
                                                          
5 European Commission (2004), paragraphs 43-45 
6 The 2004 Guidelines specify for the first time these percentages. Before the current Guidelines, the 1999 
Guidelines contained only the ambiguous expression “a significant own contribution”.  
7 European Commission (2004), paragraphs 72-77 
8 See Nicolaides and Kekelekis (2003), and Lyons et al (2008) 
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To determine whether aid is needed and how much is needed, a counterfactual 
must first be established. The counterfactual indicates what would happen 
without the aid. 
 
If a company goes bankrupt, it is reasonable to assume that the counterfactual is 
a situation where the workers of the firm become unemployed. If the market 
would function smoothly, they would find another job with a wage that reflects the 
social value of their output. But if the market fails, they remain unemployed and 
society loses the value of that output. 
 
Let, V, indicate the value of forgone output. This is the cost of non-intervention or, 
correspondingly, the benefit from intervention. But intervention is actually 
warranted only when the benefit exceeds the cost from intervention. What is this 
cost? 
 
The process of intervention itself generates costs, Ci: administrative costs 
(indicated by A), the deadweight loss of taxation (indicated by T), the risk of 
regulatory capture where the final beneficiary is not the most worthy but the one 
with the most effective lobbying (indicated by G). 
 
But the biggest negative effect of intervention is, as mentioned above, the impact 
on competitors of the aid recipient, Cc. More efficient competitors are not allowed 
to expand their output. If their costs are lower than those of the aid recipient by 
∆C and the output of the aid recipient is Q, then intervention implies that at a 
minimum society pays ∆C*Q in extra costs. 
 
It follows that intervention is in principle justified when: 
V ≥ Ci + Cc or, in expanded form, 
V ≥ A + T + G + ∆C*Q  
 
Then comes the question of how much aid. There are two ceilings here to the 
maximum amount of aid should not exceed. 
 
First and most obviously, aid, S, should not exceed the difference between social 
value and social costs; i.e. 
S ≤ V – (Ci + Cc). 
 
Second, aid should not exceed the minimum needed to bring back the recipient 
firm to viability. To understand this point, consider first the following puzzle. If 
R&R aid is granted on condition that the firm is returned to viability (i.e. it can 
operate without any public assistance), then why is aid needed at all? A rational 
investor would put money in a firm only if the net present value (NPV) exceeds 
the cost of capital. The cost of capital is the return, R, that can be obtained by the 
investor in an alternative investment. In other words, 
NPV ≥ R. 
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However, an existing shareholder may have an extra motivation to put additional 
money in the firm. He may save costs from avoiding the closure of the firm such 
as redundancy payments, etc. Therefore, a shareholder who may have liabilities, 
L, not faced by an ordinary investor would be willing to invest in the restructuring 
of the firm he already owns when 
NPV + L ≥ R. 
 
It follows that the solution to the puzzle is that if 
R ≥ NPV + L, 
then the shareholders would not want to invest additional money and would 
rather let the firm go bankrupt. This means that the maximum amount of aid, S, 
should not exceed the difference between the cost of restructuring and the sum 
of expected revenue (NPV) and avoided liabilities (L) or 
S ≤ R – (NPV + L). 
 
We can define now the conditions that must be satisfied in order for R&R to be 
socially optimum: 
1) V ≥ A + T + G + Cc = Ci + Cc 
2) S ≤ V – (Ci + Cc) 
3) S ≤ R – (NPV + L) 
Since the first condition is subsumed in the second, it is enough that conditions 
(2) and (3) are satisfied. The optimum amount of state aid must be subject to two 
constraints. 
 
Empirical analysis 
While the conditions derived above are theoretically easy to explain and justify, it 
is much harder to ascertain whether they are satisfied in practice and whether the 
R&R aid that is approved by the Commission can be regarded as an 
approximation of the socially optimum amount of aid. 
 
It is impossible to know, for example, the NPV of restructuring plans because 
they are commercial secrets and are not revealed in Commission decisions 
authorising R&R aid. It is also very difficult to know the costs of competitors of the 
aid recipients. Public authorities which grant aid or the Commission which 
assesses such aid may request information from competitors but we cannot. 
Therefore, we have devised a simpler test to find out whether too much R&R aid 
is granted. 
 
Our second condition indicates that state aid should not exceed the difference 
between the social value and the social cost of the aid. If we assume that the 
granting of R&R aid itself has no cost, which is an extreme assumption, then 
R&R aid may at the very maximum not exceed the value from preventing firms 
going bankrupt. As explained in the previous section, this value is the lost labour 
output from firm closure. The amount of the lost output depends on how long 
workers remain idle. Therefore the question is how long laid off workers stay 
unemployed. Eurostat statistics indicate that the average duration for most of the 
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decade has been less than 12 months. Therefore, we take a year as a high 
benchmark. 
 
We postulate that the value of lost output is given by the average annual salary 
(i.e. we ignore possible upstream or downstream job losses at suppliers or 
customers, respectively). Where it is possible we use information on sectoral 
salaries to evaluate R&R aid. 
 
Is this postulate realistic? We believe it is for the following reasons. The RRG and 
the broader policy for assisting restructuring is based on two assumptions which 
we doubt accurately reflect reality: 
i) The company will not survive without the aid. This is partly intrinsic in the 
definition of firm in “difficulty”; i.e. it is destined to go bankrupt if it does not 
receive outside funds. 
ii) The company will certainly survive once aid is granted (indeed, a fundamental 
requirement of the RRG is ability to return the assisted firm back to long-term 
viability). 
 
However, studies such as Oxera (2009) or Glowicka (2008) on the counterfactual 
of the state aid provision have indicated that many laid workers are hired by 
competitors, that failing companies are taken over by other companies and that 
not all recipients of state aid survive. The latter finding suggests that state 
resources are wasted. Indeed about 50% of firms that receive rescue aid, 
eventually go bankrupt. About 20-30% of firms that receive restructuring aid, 
eventually go bankrupt and about 70% of firms in difficulty are taken over. 
 
It is obvious that not all of the workers of a firm facing financial trouble will remain 
unemployed. This suggests that intervention should be limited. At the same time, 
intervention has a non-trivial rate of failure. This too suggests that intervention 
should be limited. By taking as the cost of non-intervention the amount of annual 
output of workers in ailing firms in fact we set a very onerous benchmark that 
favours R&R interventions. 
The next section explains the data base we have constructed to test the 
optimality of R&R aid. 
 
 
4. The reality of state aid for rescue & restructuring purposes: Measures 
examined in Commission decisions, 2000-2013 
 
London Economics (2004) developed a database of R&R aid granted from 1995 
to 2003. The same period was studied afterwards by Chindooroy et al (2005) and 
Glowicka (2008). This database covered 9 years and included 71 cases of which 
42 referred to restructuring aid (London Economics, 2004, p.7-9).  
Our database extends over almost 14 years (13 years plus January-April 2013) 
and includes 114 cases of restructuring aid.  
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More information on the data base is given in the document that is on the website 
of the College of Europe and can be accessed via this link: 
https://www.coleurope.eu/beer27annex 
 
 
 Period Restructuring aid 
observations 
 
London Economics 
(2004) 
 
1995-2003 (9 years) 42 
Our database (2013) 
 
2000-2013 (14 years) 114 
 
 
The data have been extracted from the case search engine of the European 
Commission’s website devoted to state aid.9 We have used only those cases that 
were related to “one-time” aid. Therefore, we have excluded state aid schemes 
(which were very numerous, especially for SMEs). We have also excluded all the 
cases related to the financial sector (banks, insurance companies, etc) because 
they have been the subject of much recent research already and because non-
financial firms have been relatively neglected. 
 
 
Total number of measures obtained from search 
engine 
236 (100%) 
State Aid schemes for SME or for entire sectors. -60 (-25%) 
State Aid for Financial Institutions -23 (-10%) 
Repeated companies (e.g. modification of a 
restructuring plan) 
-19 (-8%) 
Other reasons -20 (-8%) 
Total number of measures analysed  114 (49%) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm 
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Public policy objectives that may justify R&R aid 
It may appear surprising but in most decisions the Commission did not specify 
what was the objective (of the three explicitly defined in the RRG) that justified 
the granting of state aid. Furthermore, the four cumulative conditions for the 
compatibility of R&R aid do not require that Member States specify their policy 
objective, apart, of course, of the intention to rescue or restructure the aid 
recipients. 
 
Of all the cases in our database, only 22 (28% of cases where the Commission 
approved state Aid) contained a clear statement on the policy objective of the aid. 
Perhaps it is assumed as self-evident that SMEs have a “beneficial role in the 
economy”. This would add 32 more observations, raising the percentage to 68% 
of cases. This leaves us with almost a third of cases where it is impossible to 
determine the policy objective pursued by the aid.   
 
 
Companies located in assisted areas 
According to the RRG, “the Commission must take the needs of regional 
development into account when assessing restructuring aid in assisted areas. 
The fact that an ailing firm is located in an assisted area does not, however, 
justify a permissive approach to aid for restructuring; (…).”10 
 
Regional policy concerns (or equity objectives, as opposed to efficiency 
objectives) may be used to justify R&R aid. So the question that arises is whether 
firm failure tends to affect more under-developed regions. The information we 
can extract from the data base indicates the opposite. About 60% of R&R cases 
were not in assisted areas.  
 
 
 
                                                          
10 European Commission (2004), paragraph 55 
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We see that the number of companies restructured in non-assisted areas is 
higher than the ones in assisted areas. It is difficult to argue in favour of R&R aid 
as a remedy to unemployment problems in non-assisted areas. In these areas, 
even if a large firm goes bankrupt, its workers are more likely to find a new job. 
It appears, therefore, that a policy objective that may have some legitimacy – 
preventing bankruptcy from worsening unemployment in assisted areas with few 
job opportunities – is used geographically far wider than what can be justified in 
principle.  
 
 
Number of state aid measures over time 
The following graph shows the number of cases concerning restructuring aid 
 
. 
 
 
 
The average annual number of cases is 8.46 (a total of 110 cases for 13 years). 
Although the numbers for some years are very similar, over the period there is 
significant annual variation. 
 
In 34% of the cases, the Commission had “no objections”. These are the simplest 
cases, where the Commission considers with no serious doubt that the public 
measures comply with all the requirements established in the RRG and therefore 
a formal investigation is not needed. In another 5% of the cases, the Commission 
found no state aid. Taken together, for 39% of the cases the Commission 
decided not to open a formal investigation. 
 
 
By contrast, in 61% of notifications received, the Commission expressed its 
doubts about the compatibility of the aid with the internal market and decided to 
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open a formal investigation. In half of these cases, or 30% of the total, the 
Commission closed the investigation with a finding of compatibility and conformity 
with the RRG. 
 
On the contrary, in 40% of the cases formally investigated, or 24% of the total, 
the conclusion was negative with a finding of incompatibility. This is a very high 
proportion. Given that about 85% of notified cases is approved, the level of 24% 
of prohibited restructuring aid is twice is high. However, when considering that of 
all formally investigated cases, about 40% are prohibited or conditionally 
approved, then the 40% level is fairly comparable. 
 
During the period, restructuring cases have been closed with the following 
outcomes: 
 
 
 
 
If we focus only on state aid (see figure below) that was approved by the 
Commission, we can see a more explicit upward pattern over time. 
The dip in 2010 may be the result of the application of the so-called “Temporary 
Framework” to address the economic crisis, which expired at the end of 2011. 
Under that Framework, Member States were allowed to grant aid to firms in 
difficulty, provided that their difficulty started after July 2008.11 
                                                          
11 OJ C 83, p.1 (7.4.2009) and C 6, p.5 (11.1.2011) 
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It is rather obvious that the adoption of the current RRG in 2004 has not resulted 
in a reduction of the number of cases 
. 
 
 
 
 
Member States granting state aid 
During the period 2000-2013 only 19 out of 27 Member States notified measures 
of restructuring aid. They are shown in the graph below and then with more detail 
in the table that follows. 
 
Poland is the country with the highest number of measures. This is rather 
surprising because Poland has a middle-sized economy with fewer firms. 
Germany was indeed the second largest state aid provider over the period. Other 
countries that have regularly made use of restructuring aid are Italy (13 
measures, 11 authorised), France (12 measures, 8 authorised), Spain (9 
measures, 6 authorised) and Greece (6 measures, 3 authorised). 
 
These six countries account for over 80% of all cases in the EU! One might say, 
then, that restructuring aid is a minority phenomenon (22%) among Member 
States. Of those six countries, the most successful in terms of having its aid 
approved was Italy with a success rate of 85%. 
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Member State Total Permitted Prohibited Ongoing Ratio 
1. Poland 29 24 5 0 83% 
2. Germany 22 11 11 0 50% 
3. Italy 13 11 2 0 85% 
4. France 12 8 4 0 67% 
5. Spain 9 6 3 0 67% 
6. Greece 6 3 2 1 50-66% 
7. UK 3 3 0 0 100% 
8. Slovenia 3 2 0 1 67-100% 
9. Austria 2 2 0 0 100% 
10. Belgium 2 1 0 1 50-100% 
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11. Bulgaria 2 0 1 1 0-50% 
12. Denmark 2 1 1 0 50% 
13. Lithuania 2 2 0 0 100% 
14. Slovakia 2 1 1 0 50% 
15. Cyprus 1 1 0 0 100% 
16. Czech 
Republic 
1 1 0 0 100% 
17. Finland 1 1 0 0 100% 
18. Latvia 1 0 0 1 0-100% 
19. Malta 1 1 0 0 100% 
 
 
Economic sectors 
Although over the 114 cases that we have studied there are companies of 
practically every economic sector, we can find some sectors whose presence is 
more prominent and regular. Manufacturing is by far the most represented 
sector benefitting from about 42% of public interventions. Within this sector we 
can find very different companies. 
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Amount and instrument of aid 
We can distinguish six different instruments: grants, capital injections, loans, 
debt write-offs, public guarantees on loans granted by private banks, lower than 
market prices in the sale of public assets in the context of restructuring (so that 
they can be acquired more cheaply by the new owners) or higher than market 
prices in the purchase of private assets in the context of restructuring (so that 
they can generate more revenue for the companies that sell them). 
Firms undergoing restructuring may also obtain other advantages such as 
permission to dispose assets through expedited legal process. This, however, 
does not constitute state aid as long as there is no transfer of state resources or 
no assumption of liability by the state. 
 
The following graph shows the different instruments used by Member States to 
support their ailing companies:12  
 
 
 
 
As we see, the most used instrument is a direct grant. Almost half of the 
companies restructured receive some kind of grant from the state. Loans and 
guarantees together are also used by about 50% of the aid recipients. 
 
If we combine the analysis of instruments and Member States, we can 
determine what is the “favourite” instrument used by each Member State. 
 
                                                          
12 To correctly interpret this graph, it is important to bear in mind that usually several instruments are 
used to help the same company, and this is why the sum of percentages is greater than 100%. 
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As can be seen, for most of the countries, grants are the most often used 
instrument. Some countries, such as Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and 
Malta have only used capital injections, although the very low number of cases 
for these countries does not allow us to generalise. 
 
 
Member State Most used instrument % of cases Times used 
Austria Grant 50% 1 
Belgium Capital Injection 100% 1 
Cyprus Capital Injection + 
Guarantee 
100% 1 
Czech Republic Capital Injection 100% 1 
Denmark Loan + Guarantee 100% 1 
Finland Loan 100% 1 
France Grant 50% 4 
Germany Grant 64% 7 
Greece Grant 67% 2 
Italy Grant 77% 8 
Lithuania Write-off 100% 2 
Malta Capital Injection 100% 1 
Poland Grant 46% 11 
Slovakia Write-off 100% 1 
Slovenia Grant 100% 2 
Spain Guarantee 50% 3 
UK Grant 67% 2 
 
 
When the aid is in the form of a grant, it is fairly easy to calculate the amount of 
aid, in terms of the gross grant equivalent (GGE). If the aid is a loan, the GGE is 
the difference between the interest that should be required by the creditor in 
market conditions, and the interest actually charged by the state. Often, the 
Commission argues correctly that although a loan is given at a market rate of 
interest and terms, such rate and terms apply to healthy companies and that no 
rational private investor would give a loan on these conditions to an ailing firm. 
The GGE of aid in guarantees is the difference between the often free 
guarantee and the commercial premium that would have been paid for an 
equivalent loan. 
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The average amount of aid in our database is €162,000 and the median aid is 
€8.5 million. This clearly indicates a very skewed distribution, as can be 
observed in the following graphs which are expressed in millions of euro. About 
80% public interventions involve amounts of less than €100 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
During the period 2000-2013, the largest interventions have been the following: 
London and Continental Railways (UK, 2008).13 This was a package of grants, 
loans and loan guarantees provided by the British government with an 
astonishing total value of more than €6,000 million. This aid was approved by 
the Commission without even opening a formal investigation. 
 
Alstom (France, 2004).14 Alstom manages nuclear plants in France and it 
needed public support to carry out its restructuring process. The aid, more than 
€3,000 million, was granted through capital injections, loans and guarantees. 
This aid was finally approved by the Commission after formal investigation.  
 
Trainose (Greece, 2011).15 As a consequence of the deep recession that 
Greece is currently suffering, the national railway company is almost bankrupt. 
In order to partially support the restructuring of the company, the Greek 
government has proposed a package combining public debt write-offs and 
injections in equity, with a total value of €1,070 million. The Commission has 
already expressed its concerns and has opened a formal in-depth investigation 
which is not yet concluded. 
                                                          
13 Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-761_en.htm 
14 Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-
859_en.htm#PR_metaPressRelease_bottom 
15 Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-866_en.htm 
BOLSA FERRUZ M.A. &  NICOLAIDES Ph. - The Economics of State Aid for the Rescue and Restructuring 
of Firms in Difficulty: Theoretical Considerations, Empirical Analysis and Proposals for Reform 
 
6 
 
However, these large amounts of aid are exceptional. Yet, if we examine in 
more detail the group below €100 million, the pattern is still very similar.  
 
 
 
 
 
More than half of all companies (51.4%) receive less than €10 million, and only 
a 13.5% of the cases involve aid between €10 million and €20 million. 
If we focus on the smaller group of aid below €10 million, we derive the 
following distribution: 
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In summary, 18% of public support has been smaller than €1 million; 51% of the 
total has been smaller than €10 million; and 79% of the total has been smaller 
than €100 million.  
There still remains a non-negligible 21% of the total interventions above €100 
million, some of which are truly large (2.7% of the total interventions surpass 
€1,000 million). 
 
We can also look at the average amount of aid per Member State. 
 
Member State Total aid (€) Observations Average aid (€) 
UK 6,466,212,994 2 3,233,106,497 
France 3,694,530,000 8 461,816,250 
Germany 1,199,289,100 11 109,026,282 
Italy 731,019,972 11 66,456,361 
Austria 500,400,000 2 250,200,000 
Czech Republic 385,000,000 1 385,000,000 
Poland 303,670,990 23 13,203,087 
Belgium 240,000,000 1 240,000,000 
Denmark 178,750,000 1 178,750,000 
Malta 130,000,000 1 130,000,000 
Cyprus 113,000,000 1 113,000,000 
Spain 41,736,512 6 6,956,085 
Greece 31,320,000 3 10,440,000 
Slovenia 12,000,000 2 6,000,000 
Lithuania 8,460,000 2 4,230,000 
Slovakia 440,000 1 440,000 
Finland 300,000 1 300,000 
 
 
It is also interesting to examine the total amount of aid granted per Member 
State. We can see that the ranking changes significantly.  
 
The UK has granted the largest total volume of aid in the period. However, this 
is only due to the restructuring of London Continental Railways (2008), which 
has been the largest state aid registered in our database. The second Member 
State in terms of total aid is France where the restructuring of Alstom (2004) 
has also been a major case. France is followed by Germany, Italy and Austria. 
 
By contrast, Poland, which is the country with the higher number of 
interventions, ranks only seventh in terms of volume of aid. This shows that the 
typical intervention of Poland involves smaller amounts. 
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If we plot the average intervention we obtain the following ranking: 
 
 
 
 
The UK is the country with the largest average intervention, again because of 
London Continental Railways. France is still second, but very far from the UK. 
France has implemented numerous measures, with an average of €500 million. 
Not far from France we find the Czech Republic and Austria. 
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Germany, Italy and Poland, countries with a large number of companies that 
have undergone restructuring with public support, use lower amounts of aid on 
average and come after smaller countries such as Belgium or Denmark. 
 
This variation in the average amount of aid, that seems unrelated to the size of 
the country, suggests that aid is not optimised to remedy market failure. Indeed, 
when we measure the amount of aid as a proportion of the GDP of the country 
a very different ranking emerges. It is very small states that come at the top. 
This is most likely the result of the restructuring of a company that was large in 
proportion to the size of the national economy. However, with the exception of 
the UK, the largest grantors of aid, Germany, France and Italy, now come in the 
middle of the ranking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next table shows the results of taking the average aid amount as a 
proportion of GDP. 
 
Member 
State 
 
Observa-
tions 
Average aid (€) GDP (€million) Average aid / 
GDP 
Malta 
 
1 130,000,000 5,771.60 2.252% 
Cyprus 
 
1 113,000,000 16,005.43 0.706% 
Czech 
Republic 
 
1 385,000,000 133,430.37 0.289% 
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UK 
 
2 3,233,106,497 1,765,838.08 0.183% 
Austria 
 
2 250,200,000 256,700.82 0.097% 
Denmark 
 
1 178,750,000 212,073.83 0.084% 
Belgium 
 
1 240,000,000  315,067.85 0.076% 
France 
 
8 461,816,250  1,762,606.47 0.026% 
Slovenia 
 
2 6,000,000  33,516.48 0.018% 
Lithuania 
 
2 4,230,000  26,933.73 0.016% 
Greece 
 
3 10,440,000  193,247.13 0.005% 
Germany 
 
11 109,026,282  2,320,992.31 0.005% 
Italy 
 
11 66,456,361  1,443,863.74 0.005% 
Poland 
 
23 13,203,087  312,344.37 0.004% 
Slovakia 
 
1 440,000  56,160.54 0.001% 
Spain 
 
6 6,956,085  916,119.62 0.001% 
Finland 
 
1 300,000  164,360.92 0.000% 
 
 
 
Ownership of aid recipients 
In the period 2000-2013, 60% of the notifications from Member States 
concerned private companies and 40% were about state-owned companies. 
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If we compare the profile of state-owned and private companies, we find that 
subsidised state-owned companies are usually much bigger than private 
companies, both in terms of workers (4,233 workers on average for state-owned 
companies, against 828 workers for private companies) and in terms of turnover 
(€655.8 million against €86.7 million). They also receive a larger amount of aid 
(an average subsidy of €183 million for state-owned companies against €148 
million for private companies). 
  
Poland is definitely the Member State with the highest share of subsidised 
state-owned companies, with 22 out of 29 (76%). This contrasts with the other 
big countries, where the share is much lower (Germany: 15%, Italy: 15%, 
France: 25%).  
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It is also noticeable that many of the countries that have intervened in favour of 
only one or two companies, have done so for state-owned companies, such as 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia or Malta. None of these countries have 
contributed in the restructuring of any private company.  
 
 
Market share of ailing companies  
As would be expected, aid recipients are important employers in their region. 
This is shown in the table below where the average regional share is almost 
twice as large as the national share. This is also why regional organisations and 
authorities lobby hard in favour of R&R aid [see, for example, the views of the 
Committee of the Regions on the reform of the RRG, OJ C 139, 17/5/2013, p. 
17]. 
 
 
Relevant Market Average Market Share 
Regional 38.6% 
National 21.1% 
European 1.5% 
 
 
The typical firm that receives restructuring aid is quite large, with an average 
market share in its region of more than 38%. Nationally, the average share is 
also quite large and exceeds 20%. These shares suggest that companies 
receiving restructuring aid do have a non-negligible impact on their local 
economies. This may justify government intervention to prevent their 
bankruptcy. At the same time, however, such large market shares indicate that 
R&R aid is also more likely to have a non-negligible effect on competition. In 
this connection, it is right that the RRG impose on aid recipients the obligation 
to offer compensatory measures to mitigate the distortion of competition caused 
by R&R aid. 
 
 
Compensatory measures 
The compensatory measures offered by restructuring firms are one of the 
principal requirements of the RRG, and one of the more interesting economic 
aspects of R&R aid. 
 
Small firms benefit from more favourable treatment, since the 2004 RRG do not 
require compensatory measures by them. This is due to the belief that state aid 
for these companies causes only a small distortion of competition. 
 
BOLSA FERRUZ M.A. &  NICOLAIDES Ph. - The Economics of State Aid for the Rescue and Restructuring 
of Firms in Difficulty: Theoretical Considerations, Empirical Analysis and Proposals for Reform 
 
13 
 
During the period 2000-2013 our database indicates that the most frequent 
types of compensatory measures are the following:16 
 
 
 
 
 
By far the most frequent compensatory measure is reduction of capacity. It is 
used in 44% of cases. In 18% of cases, companies exited one or several 
market segments where they were operating before the restructuring. These 
can be either geographical (i.e. another Member State) or product markets. In 
the literature this has also been developed as somehow contrary to the idea of 
the single market (see for example, Lyons et al (2008)). 
 
 
Own contribution  
In order to ensure that R&R aid is limited to the minimum necessary, the RRG 
require beneficiaries to assume a large enough share of the restructuring costs. 
This is the so-called “own contribution”. Large firms have to contribute at least 
50%, medium-sized and small firms are only required to contribute 40% and 
25%, respectively.17 
 
 
According to the data in our database, the average own-contribution during the 
period 2000-2013 was 53%. By grouping companies according to their size and 
dividing each group into two periods – before and after the adoption of the 
current RRG – we can observe a substantial increase in own-contributions. 
                                                          
16 Since for the same company the Commission sometimes requires or the Member States propose 
several compensatory measures, the sum of percentages equals more than 100%.  
 
17 European Commission (2004), paragraph 44.  
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Average own contribution 2000-2004 2005-2013 
Small firms 17% 47% 
Medium-sized firms 40% 51% 
Large firms 56% 63% 
 
 
Not only are the own-contributions mostly larger than the minimum required by 
the RRG but they also rise in the second part of the period 2000-2013. This 
increase across the board reduces the amount of state aid and that must be 
good for avoiding distortions to competition. In some cases in the period 2000-
2004 the contributions were very low [e.g. see KHK Verbindetechnik (Germany, 
2001)18, where the Commission permitted a restructuring aid with own-
contribution of only 11.5%].19 
 
 
 
5. Economic value of subsidising employment in ailing firms 
 
The distribution of firms according to their number of workers is also highly 
uneven, as can be noted in the following graphs: 
 
 
 
 
 
Small firms with fewer than 50 workers made up 17% of the total number of 
firms that received aid. Medium-sized firms with 50 to 250 workers made up 
34% of the total. Together SMEs account for 51% of the firms that received aid. 
 
                                                          
18 Commission Decision C(2001)1781. 
19 The Commission justifies this because the firm was a SME and it was located in an assisted area.  
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We have data on employment of about 67 firms that received state aid (about 
85% of the total). The overall number of jobs of these firms is 137,963. The total 
amount of aid granted to these firms is €5,946 million. A simple division shows 
that the amount of aid per job saved is €49,293. It is important to note that this 
amount is likely to be an underestimate because the number of jobs that are 
eventually saved is likely to be lower. 
 
 
 
 
 
Firms undergoing restructuring always reduce their workforce, as overstaffing is 
one of the typical causes of high operating costs and low liquidity. This means 
that the initial number of 137,963 is eventually lower, which entails that the 
amount of aid per job that is eventually saved is higher than €49,293. 
  
According to Eurostat20, the average gross salary in Europe is €29,40021. 
Economic theory indicates that the value of output per worker is equal to the 
wage plus a proportion of the returns to capital. That is, pQ/L = (wL + rk)/L = 
wL/L+ rK/L = w + rK/L. We do not have data on the second part of the equation 
[i.e. the proportion of the returns to capital]. We can surmise, however, that the 
value of a worker to the employer is equal to the total cost of employing that 
worker. This is equal to the gross salary plus the employer’s social insurance 
and pension contributions. These are likely to be about 20% of the gross salary. 
Therefore, by multiplying the average gross salary by 1.2 we obtain a 
benchmark number of €35,280 as the cost to society from lost output. This 
implies that state aid of €49,293 is 1.4 times larger than the value of saved jobs 
or 40% larger than what is needed.  
 
 
                                                          
20 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/earnings/main_tables or 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Earnings_statistics_at_regional_level 
21 Data of 2006 
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However, there are several important caveats. First, we assume that all jobs are 
saved, which is unrealistic. Second, we also assume that the workers who lose 
their jobs do not find another one, at least for a year. This would be a rather 
pessimistic view for the part of the period before the crisis started in 2008. 
Moreover, and most importantly, we are not taking into account the costs 
generated by state aid in terms of distortion of competition in the market. 
 
At any rate, the salary of €29,400 is only the average across sectors. We can 
refine this benchmark by using data provided by the International Labour 
Organisation22 and the French Institute Molinari23 on Average Gross Wages in 
different manufacturing sectors. We can then compare the actual amount of aid 
per job where our data permit us to do so. This is indicated in the table below. 
 
The table contains information on 28 cases in the manufacturing sector. These 
firms come from 8 Member States: France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. The third column shows the number or workers 
that the company had when it began its restructuring. The fourth column shows 
the amount of state aid received and the fifth column provides the amount of aid 
per worker or “cost per worker”. We compare the derived ratios with the 
average value of saved jobs in the manufacturing sector for each Member State 
concerned. As we see, there are significant differences among Member States. 
                                                          
22 http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest 
23 http://www.langlophone.com/20100526_edition/20100526_EU27_data_table_flipped.pdf 
Firm MS Worker
s 
State Aid (€) Aid per 
worker 
(€) 
Average 
gross salary + 
employer’s 
social 
insurance & 
pension 
contribution 
(€) 
Aid per 
worker / 
(average 
gross salary + 
employer’s 
social 
contribution)  
Fagor Brandt France 2,038 31,000,000 15,211 47,177 32% 
Trèves France 6,500 73,400,000 11,292 47,177 24% 
Ilka Mafa 
Kaltetechnik 
Germ. 45 14,460,500 321,344 50,604 635% 
Wildauer 
Kurbelwelle 
Germ. 293 23,089,000 78,802 50,604 156% 
KHK Ver-
bindetechnik 
Germ. 27 1,175,000 43,519 50,604 86% 
Gothaer Fahr-
zeugtechnik 
Germ. 175 3,948,000 22,560 50,604 45% 
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Jahnke 
Stahlbau 
Germ. 60 820,000 13,667 50,604 27% 
Gotze  Natur-
steinwerk 
Germ. 8 157,600 19,700 50,604 39% 
Lintra  
Beteiligungs-
holding 
Germ. 1,000 319,487,000 319,487 50,604 631% 
Fiem Italy 40 2,500,000 62,500 30,256 207% 
Keller Italy 530 15,000,000 28,302 30,256 94% 
AB Kauno 
Ketaus 
Lithu. 455 6,460,000 14,198 6,326 224% 
AB Vingriai Lithu. 240 2,000,000 8,333 6,326 132% 
FLK Krasnik Poland 1,898 8,568,000 4,514 8,966 50% 
Fabryka 
Samochodow  
Poland 2,236 82,000,000 36,673 8,966 409% 
Mesko Poland 101 500,000 4,950 8,966 55% 
KZG Poland 85 4,052,000 47,671 8,966 531% 
Diora Poland 160 2,125,000 13,281 8,966 148% 
Huta Stalowa 
Wola 
Poland 2,400 162,165,700 67,569 8,966 754% 
Bison-Bial Poland 950 7,600,000 8,000 8,966 89% 
ZNMR Poland 80 91,000 1,138 8,966 13% 
Sedziszow Poland 443 2,750,000 6,208 8,966 69% 
PZL Debica Poland 426 3,375,000 7,923 8,966 88% 
Stomil Poland 437 750,000 1,716 8,966 19% 
Compel Rail Slovak. 130 440,000 3,385 9,518 36% 
Novoles 
Straza 
Slove. 650 6,000,000 9,231 15,664 59% 
Javor Pivka Slove. 800 6,000,000 7,500 15,664 48% 
Porcelanas 
Principado 
Spain 150 3,277,000 21,847 27,506 79% 
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In about a third of all cases, the aid clearly exceeds 100% of the annual salary 
such as for example Ilka Mafa (Germany, 2000), Lintra (Germany, 2001), 
Fabryka Samochodow (Poland, 2005), Huta Stalowa (Poland, 2005) and KZG 
(Poland, 2010). We find ratios reaching up to 750%, which means that the 
amount of state aid used to save a job is larger than the production that one of 
the saved jobs could generate in 7.5 years. Surely, any worker could be 
retrained and gainfully employed elsewhere in a period of seven years.  
And for those workers over 57 years of age, it would be cheaper for society to 
pay them to take early retirement and avoid the distortions of competition from 
keeping their otherwise inefficient employer artificially live. 
 
What is more revealing is that large and very large absolute amounts of aid 
result in much higher amounts of aid per worker. This can be the result of the 
fact that larger firms employ more capital and their restructuring requires 
significantly larger investment in upgrading outdated technology. But then the 
inadvertent effect of aid is to assist shareholders and the owners of capital 
rather than workers. This result is contrary to the formal objectives of R&R aid.  
 
 
 Average cost per 
worker 
(Amount of aid / 
Worker) 
If State Aid < €10 million € 26,937 
If  €10 million < State Aid < €100 
million 
€ 77,932 
If State Aid > €100 million € 129,636 
 
 
However, if we focus on the size of the beneficiary companies, instead of the 
size of the absolute amounts of aid, then the picture changes. The average 
amount of aid per worker in small firms is much larger than the average amount 
of aid in medium-sized or large firms. This does not make much policy sense 
either. The closure of a small firm is unlikely to have a significant impact on the 
local economy, so government intervention in such cases is less warranted. The 
fact that the average amount of aid for small firms is a multiple of annual 
salaries casts more doubt on the efficiency of intervention to save small firms. 
 
Given these variations, we have also run regressions of the amount of aid per 
worker against the number of workers in each of the three categories of 
companies (small, medium-sized and large). 
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 Average cost per 
worker 
(Amount of aid / 
Worker) 
Small enterprises (0-49 workers) € 87,916 
Medium-size enterprises (50-249 
workers) 
€ 33,424 
Large enterprises ( 250 or more 
workers) 
€ 43,351 
 
 
The regression results are indicated below. They show a fairly flat  relationship 
[with low R2] between the average amount of aid and the number of workers. 
This is indeed more consistent with the formal purpose of R&R aid. What is also 
interesting is that in the case of small and medium-sized companies the 
average declines as the size of the company increases. This would suggest that 
something like economies of scale come into play whereby the effectiveness of 
one euro of aid increases as the absolute amount of aid increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Aid per worker = 56,155 - 863 *workers.  R² = 0,1845 
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Aid per worker = 29,755 - 51 * workers. R² = 0.0146 
 
 
 
 
Aid per worker = 19,048 + 5.2 * workers. R² = 0.0247 
 
 
However, what is far more disturbing, as far as the rationality of the R&R policy 
is concerned, is the wide variation of the actual amounts of aid per worker 
around the predicted average (indicated by the straight line). Because these 
results can be influenced by the variations in salaries across Member States, 
we have also run regressions for each Member State for which we had several 
observations. This excluded countries like France, Italy, Lithuania or Slovenia. 
We were left with just two countries with a sufficient number of observations: 
Germany and Poland. 
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In both cases, there is positive relationship between cost per worker and the 
number of workers in aided firms. These results provide strong indication that 
relatively more aid goes to large capital-intensive companies. However, as 
already mentioned above, this runs contrary to the logic of R&R aid which is to 
prevent loss of output from unemployed workers. The assets of companies can 
always be sold to competitors, so such aid benefits the owners of capital rather 
than society at large. In fact if the outliers are excluded, then the lines become 
flatter, as we would expect.  
 
 
 
y = 63,666 + 232.22 * workers. R² = 0.3424 
 
 
y = 7194,5 + 13.08 * workers. R² = 0.2819 
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In summary, these findings cast serious doubt on the efficiency of R&R aid. In 
more than half of the cases we have examined, too much aid is granted. 
Irrespective of how the data are analysed, there appears to be no consistent 
policy of targeting aid to the number and value of jobs saved. In fact, the picture 
that emerges is one of granting rather random amounts of aid (from a policy 
perspective). 
 
 
 
6. Three proposals for the new Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines 
 
The European Commission initiated on December 201024 a public consultation 
to gauge the views of Member States and stakeholders on possible revision of 
the RRG. The results of the consultation will underpin the new RRG which will 
be revised in the context of the State Aid Modernisation initiative that was 
launched in May 2012. 
 
The main objectives of State Aid Modernisation are to streamline procedures, 
make the rules more user-friendly, reduce the distortionary effects of state aid 
through more rigorous economic analysis and ensure that aid does have an 
incentive effect; i.e. it is necessary and has the capacity to change the 
behaviour of the beneficiary companies. 
 
The Commission Communication on State Aid Modernisation makes specific 
mention of R&R aid. It qualifies such aid as “very distortive” and mentions that 
the objective of the new guidelines should be “controlling that very distortive 
type of aid in order to ensure that the market process of exit is interrupted by 
State intervention only when truly justified”.25 
 
It follows, in this connection, that the objectives of R&R aid should be clarified. 
Currently they are too broad. The “beneficial role of SMEs” and “loss of 
unemployment” are almost always present. In other words, together they cover 
almost every situation. If a company is small or medium-sized, then intervention 
is justified because of the “beneficial role of SMEs”. If a company is large, on 
the other hand, its bankruptcy will always entail some non-trivial loss of 
employment. 
 
The “beneficial role” of SMEs is not, moreover, defined in the RRG. At any rate, 
there is a puzzle here. SMEs make up of more than 95% of companies in 
European economies. There is nothing special about them. It is indeed unclear 
why they deserve special treatment in the context of the RRG. 
 
 
                                                          
24 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_restructuring_aid/index.html  
25 European Commission (2012),  paragraph 18 
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With respect to loss of employment caused by the failure of large firms, we 
remain sceptical. Only in high-unemployment regions this could potentially 
create a problem. Yet, 60% of cases are not in assisted areas which typically 
have higher unemployment rates. Member States are currently not required to 
provide evidence as to what will happen to workers who are laid off. 
 
So are there any relevant lessons that can be drawn from our research? We 
believe that the following proposals can be formulated on the basis of our 
findings to ensure that R&R aid is “truly justified”. 
 
 
i) Well-defined public policy objective 
Member States need to justify more thoroughly the use of R&R aid. It is not just 
that R&R aid is used without a clear public policy objective – apart from the wish 
to assist the aid recipient. More importantly, the amount of aid should be limited 
to what is warranted by the specific public policy objective pursued. In this 
paper we have defined the public policy objective to be the avoidance of lost 
output of workers who remain unemployed over a long period of time. There is 
significant evidence that Member States in several cases spend much more 
than the value of lost output. The Commission should consider the introduction 
of maximum ceilings of permissible aid that reflect the value of economic output 
in each Member State. 
 
ii) Credible counterfactual 
Given the wide variation in the amounts of R&R aid, Member States should be 
required to provide credible evidence of the likely counterfactual. How much 
money shareholders would be willing to invest, what would happen to the firm if 
it would suspend its operations (close down permanently, taken over, etc) and 
how long would laid off workers remain unemployed? 
 
iii) Quantifiable distortion 
Aid recipients are required to offer compensatory measures which, however, 
are not rigorously linked to the kind and magnitude of the expected distortion of 
competition. The experience with aid to financial institutions has proven the 
benefits of a more direct connection between the expected distortion and the 
remedial measures that should be required of the aid recipients. 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
State aid for rescue & restructuring of ailing firms is very distortionary. The aid 
recipients do nothing of what is typically required of state aid beneficiaries such 
as extra investment in underdeveloped regions, extra training, extra research or 
extra protection of the environment. Therefore, the social benefits from R&R aid 
are less visible and more questionable because they are presumed to emanate 
from the mere survival of the aided firms. 
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In order to obtain a better understanding of the impact of R&R aid, we have 
carried out an empirical analysis of relevant Commission decisions during the 
period 2000-2013. We have found the following. 
1) The number of R&R measures has been increasing over the period. 
2) Not all Member States use R&R aid. 
3) The Member States that use R&R aid most often are Poland, Germany, Italy 
and France. Six Member States account for 80% of the measures. Some 
Member States do not use R&R aid at all. 
4) The highest number of R&R measures are in the manufacturing sector. 
5) The most frequently used aid instruments are direct grants, followed by 
loans and guarantees. 
6) The majority of restructuring measures are below €10 million, although more 
than 20% are over €100 million. 
7) 51% of aided companies are SMEs (17% small ones) and 49% are large 
companies. 
8) Aided companies have an average regional market share of 38% and an 
average national market share of 21%. 
9) Only 42% of the supported companies were located in assisted areas. 
10) The most frequently used compensatory measures are reduction of capacity 
and sale of assets. 
11) More than half of the measures can be considered without any doubt highly 
inefficient, at least in terms of the amount of aid per job saved. 
12) Both across Member States and within Member States there is wide 
variation in the amount of aid per worker. This is inconsistent with a rational 
R&R policy. 
 
In order to reduce the distortionary effect of R&R aid we propose that the new 
RRG define more rigorously the public policy objectives that should be pursued 
by R&R aid and define upper limits for the amount of aid that may be granted. 
Such limits should be linked to the public policy objectives in question. 
 
Moreover, we propose that the new RRG should require the identification of a 
credible counterfactual, more thorough analysis of the likely distortion of 
competition and closer linking of compensatory measures with the type and 
magnitude of the likely distortion. 
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